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Note
Viewing Metropolitan Housing Authorities as Parties
to Be Joined, if Feasible, in Fair Housing Suits:
Will Minnesota Break "A Great Silence?"1
Elizabeth B. Bowling
I. INTRODUCTION
Racial segregation persists2 in publicly funded housing despite judicial 3 and regulatory4 mandates to integrate. 5 Federal
and state constitutions 6 and statutes 7 require the over 3,000
1. Drew S. Days, H, Introductory Remarks, The FairHousing Act After
Twenty Years, A Conference at the Yale Law School March 25-26, 1988, 6 YALE

L. & Poiy REv. 332, 334-35 (1988) (stating "[tihere has been a great silence on
fair housing issues in recent years").
2. Mary K. Nenno, Urban Policy Revisited-Issues Surface With a New
Urgency, 3(3) J. OF PLANNING Lrr. 253, 261 (1988). In addition to stratifying
communities by economic class, this trend segregates communities by race.
CouNcIL OF METROPOLITAN AREA LEAGUES OF WOMEN VOTERS (CAIAL), METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND INTEGRATION STUDY: A STUDY TO Focus
ON PROPOSALS FOR INTEGRATING METROPOLITAN AREA ScHooLs OF THE TWIN CITIES AREA OF MINNESOTA 27 (1990) [hereinafter CMAL]; DouGLAss S. MASSEY &
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEI: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS 14, 15 (1993); Gary Orfield, Ghettoizationand Its Alternatives,

in THE NEw URBAN REA1.ITY 161, 168 (Paul Peterson ed., 1985); David Rusk,
Reuniting City and Suburb: The Key to Inner City Progress,2 POVERTY & RACE

1, 2 (1993) (excerpted from DAvD RusH, Crris WITHouT SuBuBs (1993)).

3. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (ordering desegregation throughout the Chicago metropolitan housing market).
4. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 590.905 (1993) (requiring communities receiving
federal funds called Community Development Block Grants (CDBG's) to take
active steps to promote fair housing).
5. These mandates take a range of forms from injunctions against intentional segregation to orders to actively promote opportunities to integrate. See
generally, Florence Wagman Roisman & Phillip Tegeler, Improving and ExpandingHousing Opportunitiesfor Poor People of Color: Recent Developments
in Federaland State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 313 (1990) (summarizing
current remedies for segregation). For this Note's purposes, full integration
means the presence throughout the metropolitan area, represented in concentrations roughly approximate to percentage of the metropolitan population as a
whole, of all racial groups.
6. See generally, U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XV (providing the basis for
due process and equal protection claims). See also, Southern Burlington Co.
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public housing agencies (PHA's) operating across the country8 to
correct racial segregation in publicly funded housing. 9 Nevertheless, two continuing forms of racial segregation contribute to
the concentration of persons of color in low-income urban housing projects' 0 and conversely, to the concentration of whites in
the more affluent suburban communities:"- namely, segregation
among people within a single community 12 and segregation between communities. 13 Traditional remedies, including efforts of
local PHA's acting alone,' 4 can only address the former, intracommunity segregation. 15 Metropolitan-wide segregation results from the exclusion by many communities of housing amenable to public funding.' 6 As a result of metropolitan-wide
segregation, the concentration of persons of color in substandard

NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (interpreting state
constitutional provisions to prohibit discrimination against low-income
persons).
7. E.g., The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1983 (1988); the United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412,
50 Stat. 888 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437s (1988)); the Minnesota
Human Rights Act MINN.STAT. § 363 (1992).
8. Telephone Interview with Information Department, Public Housing
Authority Ass'n, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 27, 1993). Of these PHA's, hundreds
are metropolitan PHA's that operate at the county or metropolitan government
level. Telephone Interview with Information Specialist, Council of Large Public
Housing Authorities, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1, 1993).
9. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 314.
10. Rusk, supra note 2, at 4; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 15.
11. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 11.
12. Id.; Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L.
REv. 739, 757 n.78 (1993).
13. Dubin, supra note 12, at 755.
14. Traditional civil rights claims cannot reverse segregation patterns because the claims address only segregation within a local unit and ignore segregation among local units. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 329; see also,
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1976) (stating that a housing market
usually extends beyond city limits, including all areas among which dwelling
units compete for residents, and analogizing communities to school districts
where discriminatory practices in one create spillover effects in others).
15. To address inter-community segregation, the central city or the affected city residents must ordinarily sue the state or individual suburbs to remedy metropolitan-wide segregation. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 318
(citing cases).
16. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 15; Dubin, supra note 12, at 744,
749.
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urban housing projects,17 distanced from job growth and educational innovation, continues unabated.1 8
17. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 15. Evidence continues to accrue
to support the proposition that an individual living in the midst of concentrated
poverty faces a decreased likelihood of ever escaping poverty. METROPOLrrAN
COUNCIL STAFF REPORT, HOUSING =rE REGION: MOVING INTO THE 1990s, Pub.
No. 450-90-003 (1990) [hereinafter HOUSING THE REGION]; GARY ORFIELD AND
CAROLE AsINAzE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE POLICY AND BLACK OP-

PORTUNrrY, xiii-xviii (1991); Rusk, supra note 2, at 2; UNITED WAY OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE FACE OF THE TWIN CITIES: TRENDS AFFECTING HEALTH AND HUMA
SERVICES IN THE 90s 24 (1991) [hereinafter UNITED WAY]; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED:

THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUB-

LIC POLICY 182-83 (1987).

18. Low-income persons and persons of color increasingly find themselves
restricted to housing in blighted central city areas and excluded from thriving
suburban communities. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 14; Dubin, supra
note 12, at 772. Particularly in vast metropolitan areas, low-income persons
and persons of color must live in areas inaccessible to commensurate jobs and
good schools. Elliot D. Sclar, Back to the City, TECH. REV. 29, 32 (August/September 1992); WILSON, supra note 17, at 39, 46.
As poverty concentrates, the cost of providing traditional services at constant levels increases. Dubin, supra note 12, at 779. Formerly effective private
and government initiatives become obsolete. Dubin, supra note 12, at 779;
LEADERSHIP COUNCIL FOR METROPOLITAN OPEN CoMMUNITIs, THE COSTS OF
HOUSING DISCRIMINATION AND SEGREGATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCI-

STATEMENT 27 (James J. Brice ed., 1986) [hereinafter LEADERSHIP
COUNCIL].
ENCES

Proponents of income- or class-clustering theories argue that inter-community stratification by income and race is a natural consequence of two factors:
inner-city location of services that low income people use (such as mass transit
or welfare distribution sites); and preference for living near family or people of
the same race, income, and occupation. According to these critics, removing
barriers to low-income persons' mobility would not impact residence patterns or
social isolation. Peter Leyden and Sherrie Mazingo, Where to Live? Many in
Similar Jobs Like Same Metro Areas, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., August 17,
1992, at IA; Jean Hopfensberger, Suit Alleges Segregation in Public Housing,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TaB., July 28, 1992, at 8A (quoting Sharon Sayles Belton).
Yet others' empirical analysis find that residents' personal preferences alone
cannot account for the high concentration of low-income persons and persons of
color in the inner city. John Kasarda, Urban Change and Minority Opportunities, in THE NEW URBAN REAr 33, 35 (Paul Peterson ed., 1985); John
Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transitionand the Underclass, 501 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 26 (1989) [hereinafter Kasarda (1989)]; MICKEY KAus,
THE END OF EQUALITY 120 (1992); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 7; WILSON, supra note 17, at 49-52.
As a result, low-income people, disproportionately people of color, continue
to suffer unsafe neighborhoods, lose their housing independence, and grow increasingly isolated from the society at large. James A. Kushner, Apartheid in
America: An Historicaland LegalAnalysis of ContemporaryRacial Segregation
in the U.S., 22 How. L. J. 547, 553 (1979); see also LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, supra
note 18, at 3; WILSON, supra note 17, at Ch. 2.
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Equipped with an array of remedies, 19 but hindered by local
government boundaries, 20 trial courts face the arduous task of
integrating housing within communities that themselves consist
primarily of persons of color.2 1 After long and complex litigation,2 2 trial courts generally order remedies that fail to reach
across local boundaries. 23 These piecemeal resolutions have a
negligible effect on the lives of the plaintiffs seeking fair housing 24 and cannot begin to resolve metropolitan-wide segregation
25
problems.
This Note summarizes this national litigation dilemma in
metropolitan housing integration and offers a realistic solution.
Part I describes the foundations of fair housing law, discusses
court powers to formulate remedies, and focuses on the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area as the stage for a pending
housing desegregation lawsuit, Hollman v. Kemp. 2 6 Part II con19. See generally, Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 315 (describing variety of actions and remedies).
20. Federal courts are fundamentally restrained from actually restructuring the operations of state and local governments. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 738 (1974). Yet courts have formulated acceptable metropolitan-wide remedies that do not cross the line into actual restructuring. Liddel v. Board of Ed.,
491 F. Supp. 351, 352-59 (E.D. Mo. 1980). When regional employment and
housing markets cross local boundaries, housing segregation remedies should
also cross those boundaries. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976). For a
discussion of these tensions, see Comment, FederalHousingand School Desegregation: InterdistrictRemedies Without Busing, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 575, 576
(1981); Kushner, supra note 18.
21. Rusk, supra note 2, at 2.
22. The time from suit commencement to court order can extend to a decade, placing a difficult burden on low-income plaintiffs who will likely never
benefit personally from the outcome. E.g., Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 284 (filed
1966, decided 1976); Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d 1368 (1987) (filed 1980, decided
1987); NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361 (1989) (fied 1980, decided 1989);
Southern Burlington NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (filed
1970, decided 1975).
23. Comment, supra note 20, at 601-02. On the basis of demographic evidence demonstrating egregious segregation, courts have ordered remedies
which cross local boundaries. E.g., Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296-300; see also,
Comment, supra note 20, at 579 (discussing Liddel, 491 F. Supp. at 351).
24. Comment, supra note 20, at 579. Inertia within institutions implementing court orders perpetuates the status quo. Dubin, supra note 12, at 75357; Rusk, supra note 2, at 2; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 14.
25. Gautreaux,425 U.S. at 292, 299; see also infra text accompanying notes
252-254 (discussing relief available under this Note's proposal).
26. Hollman v. Kemp, No. 4-92-712 (D. Minn. filed July 27, 1991) (complaint on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter Hollman complaint].
Low-income housing residents have brought a class-action suit against the city
of Minneapolis, federal housing authorities, and local public housing authorities. The complaint alleges that the defendants have deliberately administered
public and subsidized housing programs in a manner that reinforces racially
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tends that housing segregation remedies should cross local government boundaries and proposes that when a party brings a
segregation lawsuit without naming the metropolitan housing
authority,27 a court should join the metropolitan authority28 as
to the appropriate claims.
II. FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY, TO CIVIL RIGHTS
29
REMEDIES, TO THE -GREAT SILENCE"

A. FAIR HousING DoOTRn
The federal government began to subsidize low-income
housing in the 1930s by guaranteeing home mortgages to lowincome families 3 ° and building public housing.3 1 The governsegregated housing patterns. The plaintiffs assert claims under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, The Fair Housing Act of 1968,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sections 1981-1983 (1992), the
United States Housing Act of 1937, the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the Minneapolis Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution. They chose federal court, although state courts also had jurisdiction over all claims, because federal courts have heard many housing discrimination cases involving HUD and follow fairly settled principles with respect to
its liability and its grantee agencies' responsibilities. Telephone interview with
Litigation Advisory Team, Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance (Sept. 29, 1993).
Because Hollman is a pending case, this Note does not discuss any additional specific strategies the plaintiffs considered. This Note suggests that
other legitimate concerns might prevent plaintiffs from suing the metropolitan
housing authority. For example, in complicated suits implicating a number of
local government actors, plaintiffs might find that local political controversies
and inter-governmental dependencies color the proceedings in state court. A
corollary concern might be whether the case would present a larger issue to the
state court than to the federal court. The federal court could not only apply the
law with greater experience but could more easily approach the facts with fresh
perspective.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 100-103 (discussing potential plaintiffs' reasons for failing to sue the metropolitan housing authority). These reasons generally include ignorance of the metropolitan housing authority's
oversight role, fear of political consequences, and fear of retaliation. In a suit
among private parties dealing at arms length, a plaintiff could expect that defendants would pursue related claims against other responsible parties as potential co-defendants. Central cities, however, have little incentive to sue the
suburbs because to do so could have sweeping political and fiscal consequences
for inter-community relations.
28. Under the federal rules, the court has authority to order joinder, FED.
R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1), and also has supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1990); see infra notes 123-126 and accompanying text (extensive analysis of

joinder).
29. Days, supra note 1, at 334-35.
30. CruL, supra note 2, at 27; Rusk, supra note 2, at 2.
31. CAL, supra note 2, at 27; Rusk, supra note 2, at 2.
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ment greatly expanded these efforts 32 during the War on Pov3
erty campaign of the Great Society era.3 The 196434 and 196835
civil rights acts codified fair housing principles and established
standards for finding violations. 3 6 Title V13 7 and Title VIII,3 8
along with the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, provide the primary bases for liability arising from residential segregation and discrimination. 3 9 In 1968, the U.S.
Supreme Court applied the civil rights acts to outlaw discrimination in all public and private housing, 40 causing a dramatic
reform in federal housing administration away from de jure segregation 4 ' of people of color in publicly funded housing. 4 2 Enforcement, however, rested entirely on private lawsuits.4 3 In
32. Despite programs designed to remedy the problem, millions of low-income Americans cannot obtain basic housing. Nenno, supra note 2, at 261 (citing a Harvard study, William C. Apgar & H. James Brown, The State of the
Nation's Housing (1988)). State, federal, and local government programs attempt to correct the housing market failure by providing affordable housing.
FORSBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 27, 28. For a brief summary of government
housing interventions since the 1950s, see Ernest Erber, MetropolitanHousing
Allocation Planning,URBAN LAND 8 (April 1974). For a thorough review of federal programs, see Fred Fuchs, Introduction to HUD ConventionalPublicHousing, Section 8 Existing Housing, Voucher, and Subsidized Housing Programs,
Parts 1-2, 25 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 782-92, 990-1000 (1991). The most common
types of public housing are publicly-owned housing projects in which every resident meets low-income or poverty-level criteria, publicly-owned individual units
which are not located near other publicly-owned units (known as scattered-site
public housing), and housing vouchers given directly to low-income residents to
subsidize their rent in privately-owned housing. CGL, supra note 2, at 27.
33. CMAL, supra note 2, at 27; Rusk, supra note 2, at 2; see also, CHARLES
M. LAMB, FAIR HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1992)
(describing policies and actual changes in fair housing under several administrations); EJIKEE M. OaoKo, A COMPARATrvE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF "FAIR HOUSING," TITLE VIII OF THE CmWL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968 UNDER
THE CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS (1976-1984) (1988) (discussing aftermath of the Great Society Programs with respect to housing).
34. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1990).
35. Title VIII, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1990).
36. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 317; Dubin, supra note 12, at 782;
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 14.
37. Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
38. Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
39. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 314 (citing cases).
40. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding that the
Fair Housing Act bars discrimination in sale or lease of housing, both public
and private).
41. CmAL, supra note 2, at 27.
42. Id.
43. Several commentators suggest that because the Fair Housing Act relied primarily upon private enforcement, it was necessarily weak and largely
unenforced. CmAL, supra note 2, at 27; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 14.
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1988, having determined that private enforcement alone had
proven insufficient," Congress enacted The Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, which gave the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)45 authority4 6to penalize
those who discriminate in housing sales or rentals.
1. Defining Fair Housing
The civil rights acts and cases interpreting them define legally fair housing as housing free of both intended47 and effective48 racial discrimination. 49 For decades after the Supreme
Court condemned intentional segregation, public housing authorities tended to allocate or build new publicly funded housing
in proximity to existing projects,5 0 many of which were originally intentionally segregated. This practice resulted in dramatic, effective segregation. 5 ' Few recent plaintiffs argue
44. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note
DISCR MNATION LAW AND LITIGATION

2, at 14; ROBERT G. ScHWEmm, HOUSING
§§ 5.1, 10.4 (1) (1990). Plaintiffs have

brought no more than fifty cases annually. LEADERSHIP CoUNCmIL, supra note
18, at 3. Private enforcement is problematic because plaintiffs often fail to survive standing challenges. In general, to obtain standing the plaintiff must
demonstrate not only a "'distinct and palpable injury,' but also a 'fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 60 (1978). In
the zoning context, the Court denied standing to Rochester, New York, residents who sued a suburb for exclusionary zoning against low-income persons.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 492 (1975). Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
absent the restrictive zoning, a substantial probability existed that plaintiffs
would have been able to procure housing in the suburb. Id. Rochester taxpayers making an argument that the suburb's failure to provide low-income housing increased the Rochester tax burden also failed the standing test. Id.
Moreover, plaintiffs continue to bear a difficult burden of proof for fair
housing violations. Dubin, supra note 12, at 485. While they no longer need to
demonstrate intentional discrimination, courts of appeals have split with respect to what comprises the elements of proof. Id. at 785 n.217 and accompanying text.
45. For a thorough discussion of HUD's creation and programs, see Fuchs,
supra note 32.
46. CMAL, supra note 2, at 27.
47. De jure segregation is government approved discrimination. Roisman
& Tegeler, supra note 5, at 317. Intentional discrimination is discrimination
using race as at least one criteria for decision making. Id.
48. De facto or effective segregation results from behavior which, absent
proof of intent to discriminate on the basis of race, tends to foster segregation.
Id.; Dubin, supra note 12, at 784-85.
49. Karl Tauber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination,6
YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 339, 346-47 (1988); Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at
313-14.
50. LEADERsHrP CouNcIL, supra note 18, at 1-2; Dubin, supra note 12, at
752-53, 773; Comment, supra note 20, at 582, 586.
51. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 15; Kushner, supranote 18, at 594.
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intentional segregation, 52 yet poverty, race, and residence in
substandard housing continue to highly correlate. 53 Effective
racial segregation can result from discrimination based on factors such as income, number of children, or public assistance
status. 54 Given the socio-economic inequalities that persist in
our society, as poverty concentrates, 5 5 so does race. 56 Federal
52. Telephone interview with Litigation Advisory Team, supra note 26.
53. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 150 (citing empirical work); Rusk,
supra note 2, at 2.
54. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 320.
55. The U.S. Census defined the 1988 poverty level as $12,092 per year for
a four person household, and $6,024 per year for a one person household. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES

1990, at

423 (1990).
Poverty tends to concentrate in particular neighborhoods. CMAL, supra
note 2, at 27. When some communities exclude affordable housing, poverty concentrates in those communities that do permit affordable housing. U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra, at 442-43, Table 715. Persons with incomes below
the poverty line typically must spend from 45 percent to 60 percent of their
income on market-priced rent. Id. at 442-43, Table 714. After accounting for
household expenses beyond rent, the percentages worsen for people in poverty:
% Spent On
% Spent On
Income Quintiles Before Taxes
Shelter
Total Housing
All groups
14.9%
27.4%
Lowest 20% ($4,611)
45.6%
82.9%
Second 20% ($11,954)
23.0%
42.7%
Third 20% ($20,943)
16.6%
30.9%
Fourth 20% ($33,276)
13.7%
25.6%
Highest 20% ($65,750)
11.3%
20.5%
Id. According to HUD, which administers national housing initiatives, a
household should spend no more than 30% of its gross income on housing.
Memorandum from Kathy Novak, Legislative Analyst, to Minnesota State Representative Myron Orfield 3-4 (November 5, 1992) (on file with the Minnesota
House of Representatives, House Research Department). Applying the HUD
30% standard to Minnesota, one person and four person households in Minneapolis-St. Paul earning median incomes should spend approximately $892 per
month and $1276 per month respectively on housing. Households grossing
$10,710 for one person or $15,300 for four persons-defined as low income because their income is 30% of area median income for that household sizeshould pay no more than $268 per month and $382 per month respectively. Id.
Yet, in Minneapolis, studio apartments average $313 per month, one-bedrooms
$381 per month, and two-bedrooms $494 per month. MINEAPoLS CITY PLANNING DEPARTMENT, MINNEAPoLIs HOUSING UPDATE: Mm-YEAR 1990, at 2. The
average rent for a Minneapolis apartment across all sizes was $392 at mid-year.
Id. In 1990, the Twin Cities housing cost of living index was 112.3 compared to
a 100 point national average. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A STATISTICAL ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT: STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BooK 1991, at 33,
Table A.
The median income for Twin Cities renters is nearly half that of homeowners. METROPOLITAN CoUNCon OF THE TWIN CITIES, MEETING THE REGION'S HOUSING NEEDS IN THE 1990's: A THREE-PART PROPOSAL, 18 Pub. No. 450-91-029
(1991) [hereinafter MEETING THE REGION'S HOUSING NEEDS]. Renters are be-
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fair housing law evolved in response to overt racial segregation
in housing but for many years did not address the persistent
link between poverty and race.5 7 Today, courts and legislatures
largely agree that public entities do not fulfill their fair housing
58
obligations merely by eradicating intentional segregation.
Many courts have interpreted the Constitution and Title VIII to
60
impose an obligation 5 9 on responsible government agencies
coming increasingly poor and paying disproportionate income percentages on
housing. Id. These households sacrifice more to keep their housing, and must
stretch the remaining resources further to pay for food, utilities, transportation,
and other needs. Nearly 9% of all renter households had incomes under $8,000
and paid over 50% of their income for rent. Id.
56. Although race and poverty tend to concentrate within the same neighborhoods, income alone cannot explain residence in segregated neighborhoods.
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 12; WILSON, supra note 17, at Ch. 2. For
example, in 1990, the Minneapolis population consisted of 22 percent persons of
color, 30 to 40 percent of whom lived below the poverty line. UNITED WAY,
supra note 17, at 15, 23. Minority residents frequently express a desire to move
to safer neighborhoods in which their children will face greater opportunities
and fewer dangers. Several comprehensive studies conducted by James Rosenbaum conclude that integrated neighborhoods result in healthier, more successful outcomes for all persons, although difficult transition periods of one year or
longer may occur. E.g., James E. Rosenbaum and Susan Popkin, Employment
and Earningsof Low-Income Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs,in TiE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 342 (Christopher Jenks and Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991);
James E. Rosenbaum et al., Low-Income Black Children in White Suburban
Schools: A Study of School and Student Responses, 56:1 J. NEGRO EDUC. 35
(1987); James E. Rosenbaum et al., Social Integration of Low-Income Black
Adults in Middle-Class White Suburbs, 38:4 Soc. PROBS., (1991); James E. Rosenbaum et al., White Suburban Schools' Responses to Low-Income Black Children: Sources of Successes and Problems, 20:1 URB. REV. 28 (1988). The
findings also confirm that scattered-site subsidized housing, in which low-income households receive a housing voucher for use anywhere in the metropolitan housing market, provides better quality of life than concentrated projects do
for people living in poverty. In addition, scattered-site housing widely distributes costs associated with special services needed by these persons. "The [Twin
Cities Metropolitan] Council believes that a balanced distribution of housing for
all income levels throughout the region is best. It promotes diversity, provides
good role models and learning experiences for children, and prevents the concentration and multiplication of crime and other social problems often associated with poverty." METROPOLITAN COUNCIL STAFF REPORT, HOUSING THE
REGION: MOVING I-no THE 1990s, 11 Pub. No. 450-90-003 (March 1990). Yet
minorities' repeated attempts to seek affordable housing outside the inner-city
continue to fail. Hollman v. Kemp, No. 4-92-712, 4-11 (D. Minn. filed July 27,
1991) (complaint on file with the Minnesota Law Review); MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 2, at 12; Jean Hopfensberger, Suit Alleges Segregation in Public
Housing, MINNEAPOLIS STAR Tam., July 28, 1992, at Al.
57. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 312, 343.
58. Comment, supra note 20, at 581-87.
59. Title VIH imposes this obligation through express language. Roisman
& Tegeler, supra note 5, at 325-27 (citing statutory language and discussing
NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987)
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and other participants in housing and community development
programs 6 1-- such as state and local PHA's-to act affirmatively
to promote integration. 6 2 To an extent, the duty to promote fair
housing follows the federal dollars as they disperse throughout
publicly funded housing initiatives. 63 Because low-income housing shortages often result in racial segregation, some states
have taken a further step to address directly discrimination
against low-income persons. This approach, however, remains
the exception. 64

and Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 715 F. Supp. 835, 841 (N.D. Ohio
1989)). Courts also read implied duties into Title VIII. Roisman & Tegeler,
supra note 5, at 327-28 (discussing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395
(1986)).
60. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970).
61. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-282,
88 Stat. 633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (1988)); Otero v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973); 24 C.F.R. § 570.601(b)
(1993).
62. 24 C.F.R. § 570.904, which defines criteria for receipt of CDBG funds,
enumerates a number of actions that fulfill the "affirmatively furthering fair
housing" standard. In general, this standard requires race-conscious action to
cure past discrimination and segregation "to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases." Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 326 (citing
NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir.
1987)).
63. All federal agencies and executive departments must affirmatively administer housing programs and activities to promote fair housing. Title VIII, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1990). See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d at 816. A
claim based on HUD's unconstitutional behavior can succeed due to HUD's discriminatory action, failure to affirmatively provide fair housing, knowledge of
grantee PHA's discriminatory action, or failure to properly oversee those PHA's
which it funds. Roisman & Tegeler, supranote 5, at 325-30. In addition, courts
have held that private parties receiving federal money to supply low-income
housing must not practice discrimination. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1990).
64. Tauber, supra note 49, at 346-47 (1988); Roisman & Tegeler, supra note
5, at 343, 344 (citing, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D - 301 (West 1992) (effective
Jan. 1, 1986); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192
(N.J. 1977); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316
(N.D. Ohio 1924) rev'd by Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 390, 395
(1926)); see also Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 511 N.E.2d 67, 69
(N.Y. 1987) (denying challenge to town's refusal to participate in government
program promoting low- and moderate-income housing, upholding the particular zoning use, but stating "implicit in our rulings is a recognition of the principle that a municipality may not legitimately exercise its zoning power to
effectuate socio-economic or racial discrimination").
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2. Allocating and Reviewing the Duty to Assure Fair Housing
Among Federal, State, and Local Actors: A Source
of Confusion
Because federal, state, and local officials oversee housing
programs differently from locality to locality, plaintiffs and
courts face a formidable task in determining whether each actor
has fulfilled its fair housing duty under the appropriate standard.6 5 HUD funds most housing programs and must guarantee, under Title vIIrs express language, that grantees
66
affirmatively administer the programs to further fair housing.
Although state and local PHA's are created by state statute and
are locally governed, they receive most funding from federal
68
sources, including HUD.6 7 When acting as federal grantees,
these PHA's must meet "affirmative duty" administration standards. 69 State legislatures, however, sometimes provide additional public funding for housing.70 When fimding low-income
housing, state legislatures must abide by federal and state civil
may
rights laws. When administering only state funding, PHA's
71
not have to meet the federal affirmative duty standard.
After a plaintiff has decided to sue a particular agency for
failing to fulfill its fair housing duty, the court must examine
that agency's action by applying both fair housing and administrative law principles. The standard of review under pure administrative law differs significantly from that applied in fair
housing cases, so the court's choice with respect to which72line of
cases to follow may affect the case's ultimate resolution.
The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) dictates the extent to which a court may scrutinize agency decisions and de65. Comment, supra note 20, at 592; Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at
313, 314, 328.
66. Comment, supra note 20, at 589.
67. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 340, 341.
68. "Federal funding" subject to these standards includes HUD funds and
CDBG funds. When HUID or CDBG grants do not fund a PHA, however, HUD
can do nothing to assure that agency's compliance. Comment, supra note 20, at
602.
69. Comment, supra note 20, at 594.
70. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 318.
71. Id.
72. Most administrative precedents focus on federal agency liability. Relatively few cases have been brought against metropolitan-level state agencies.
Telephone Interview with Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, supra
note 8.
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fines "agency action" to include "failure to act."73 The Supreme
Court, however, recently reinforced its policy of deference to an
agency when reviewing administrative inaction. 74 In reviewing
agency inaction outside the housing context, a court must defer
to administrative discretion and decision making ability. An
agency's refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is "presumptively unreviewable." 75 When a legislature establishes
specific guidelines for enforcement decisions, however, a court
may determine whether the agency followed the statutory guidelines. 76 Long-standing patterns of enforcement followed by sudden, unexplained non-enforcement may subject the agency to a
higher level of judicial scrutiny. 77 A more intrusive review standard may apply to agency determinations having constitutional
implications. 78 At least two states have taken the position that
when an agency possesses the authority to adopt rules, those
79
rules have the full force of law as if mandated by statute.
Because fair housing cases involve fundamental constitutional and civil rights, courts have more discretion even absent a
clear exception to presumptive unreviewability. When a federal
73. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1992) [hereinafter
APA]. In particular, APA section 706 expressly requires a court's review when
an agency has unlawfully withheld action. Id. at § 706.
74. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (analogizing FDA officer discretion to criminal justice prosecutorial discretion and emphasizing practical difficulties in reviewing exercise of managerial judgment broadly conferred).
75. Id. at 831.
76. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975) (holding Secretary of
Labor's refusal to challenge union election reviewable because governing statute required Secretary to bring suit if he found probable cause that election
rules violation occurred); see Ronald M. Levin, UnderstandingUnreviewability
in Administrative Law, 74 MINN.L. REv. 689 (1990).
77. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd.of Trade, 412 U.S.
800 (1973) (stating that a presumption exists that the policies committed to an
agency by Congress will be best served if a settled rule is followed and that,
consequently, an agency has a duty to at least explain its departure from prior
norms); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (requiring agency to
comply with its own rules or explain non-compliance even though it voluntarily
adopted the rule).
78. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936)
(requiring de novo review of constitutional facts).
79. Wilkins v. Perales, 487 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding
that an agency is bound by its own regulations: plaintiffs complained that
agency decision not to enforce its own regulation violated their constitutional
rights); Duflo Spray-Chemical, Inc. v. Jorling, 153 A.D.2d 244 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (holding agency bound by language of its own regulation and prohibited
from construing it in such a manner as to render the plain language meaningless); Harsh Invest. Corp. v. State Hous. Div., 744 P.2d 588, 591 (Or. App. 1987)
(restating holding in Bronson v. Moonen, 528 P.2d 82 (Or. 1974)).
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housing authority such as HUT violates its own regulations8 0 or
engages in a pattern of inaction in contravention of its statutory
mandate, such action is subject to review under the APA.8 1 In
cases reviewing metropolitan agency actions outside housing,
courts have followed administrative law precedents calling for
shallow review.8 2 In fair housing cases involving state and local
PHA's, many courts analogize state and local PHA's to HUD for
reviewability purposes.8 3 If, however, a plaintiff sues a state or
local PHA in a court inexperienced in fair housing law, that
court might follow traditional administrative law principles and
consider the agency's action presumptively unreviewable. 84 For
instance, the court might not examine the record to determine
85
whether the agency satisfied applicable civil rights laws.
Another theory allows courts to review state and local housing authority actions involving civil rights claims. Absent both a
clear exception to the presumptively unreviewable standard and
an analogous-to-HUTD argument, one federal court reviewed not
only HUD's action or inaction, but also the metropolitan housing
authority's enforcement patterns.8 6 The court reasoned that because the metropolitan agency acted as a pass-through agency
for HUD policies, the court should review the agency's activities
as it would review HUD's activities. 8 7 Recently, some courts
have suggested that Title VIII carries implied obligations to
eliminate, compensate for, and overcome prior substantive inequality, and using this reasoning, have held state PHA's to the
higher reviewability standard imposed on HUD.88
Plaintiffs seeking an effective remedy for metropolitan-wide
segregation face a deeper problem than either the lack of uniform duty among housing funders and administrators or judicial
reviewability. HUD and state and local PHA's can plan housing
and allocate public funding but cannot control zoning boards in80.
81.
82.
603-04
83.

See Harsh, 744 P.2d at 594 (extending this reasoning to state agencies).
NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 364 (D. Mass. 1989).
See, e.g., Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601,
(Tenn. 1977).
Id.; Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 320.

84. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); supra notes 74-75 and

accompanying text.
85. Cf. Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1209 (6th Cir.
1987); infra note 86 and accompanying text.
86. In Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., the court reviewed both Lucas
Metropolitan Housing Authority and HUD actions and inactions. Jaimes, 833
F.2d at 1209.
87. Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 715 F. Supp. 835, 837 (N.D. Ohio
1989).

88. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 327.
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side or outside a community, 8 9 so they must work within the
constraints of exclusionary zoning. 90 At minimum, PHA's must
inform clients that they can apply certain types of federal subsidies to housing anywhere. 9 1 Yet, even if the PHA does everything within its power to fairly distribute persons throughout its
jurisdiction, dramatic metropolitan-wide segregation can result
because factors beyond the PHA's control may render housing
92
outside its jurisdiction unavailable to low-income persons.
3.

Sharing the Duty with Metropolitan Government

Several state legislatures addressed the problem of piecemeal services by creating agencies responsible for coordinating
public services throughout their metropolitan areas. 93 Seen as
locally sensitive administrations accountable to the entire
state, 9 4 some of these agencies received legislative mandates to
oversee publicly funded housing.9 5 When these metropolitan
agencies fail in their fair housing mission, 9 6 the publicly funded
housing market again fragments, 97 segregation increases, 98 and
frustrated plaintiffs can be expected in court. If these plaintiffs
do not name their metropolitan housing authority as a defend89. Dubin, supra note 12, at 769.
90. Id. at 756; see, e.g., MmN. STAT. § 473.859, subd. 4(c) (1992) (requiring
that local government units provide comprehensive housing plans regarding
low and moderate income housing as part of land use planning process, but
stating in subdivision one that if in conflict with local zoning ordinances, zoning
trumps obligation to metropolitan area fair share goals).
91. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 326.
92. Id.; Dubin, supra note 12, at 755, 756.
93. Across the nation, states with large metropolitan areas are choosing
the metropolitan government model for distributing and administering particular services such as public works, transportation, and subsidized housing while
retaining autonomous city and local governments for all other functions. In
particular, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Washington
D.C.; Denver, Colorado; Toledo, Ohio; Lorain, Ohio; Miami Valley Region, Ohio;
San Bernadino County, California; and Delaware Valley Region, Delaware, established active metropolitan agencies which oversee housing and land-use
planning. Telephone Interview with Research Department, Metropolitan
Council (October 1, 1993); ARTHUR NAFrAuN, MAKING ONE COMMMUNITY OUT
OF MANY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE METROPOUTAN COUNCIL OF THE TWIN CrrIEs

AREA 5, 8 (1986).
94. See NAFTALiN, supra note 93, at 16, 17.
95. See NAFrALmN, supra note 93, at 16, 73.

96. These metropolitan governments face or participate in the legacy of racial segregation practiced by other levels of government. Dubin, supra note 12,
at 753-54. Courts deciding housing segregation suits will be asked to formulate
remedies in increasingly complex settings.
97. Rusk, supra note 2, at 2; NAFTALiN, supra note 93, at 8, 16.
98. Rusk, supra note 2, at 3.

19941

HOUSING AUTHORITY JOINDER

747

ant in the litigation,9 9 the court cannot accord complete relief,
particularly to all class members in a class action suit, because
the existing defendants cannot remedy inter-community
segregation.' 0 0
Plaintiffs may not sue the metropolitan housing authority of
their own volition for several reasons. First, the complex housing administration scheme can lead plaintiffs to overlook the actor best positioned to perpetuate and remedy segregation-the
metropolitan housing authority-and enter lawsuits unlikely to
yield effective remedies because they take an unduly narrow approach to causation.' 0 ' For example, a community which
harbors concentrated poverty and disproportionate numbers of
minorities may seem a logical target for litigation and corrective
action. That community may have openly contributed to segregation in the past, but it is probably not the primary discriminatory actor today: it cannot force other communities to make
housing available.' 0 2 At the complaint stage, the plaintiffs may
not realize the crucial role the metropolitan housing authority
plays in inter-community segregation: the local PHA is clearly
implicated, HUD has become a matter-of-course defendant in
fair housing suits, and federal courts have experience dealing
with both, but the metropolitan housing authority is the invisible intermediary.' 0 3 Because the metropolitan authority often
administers programs on which plaintiffs depend, to expect
plaintiffs to voluntarily sue the metropolitan authority is to ex10 4 If
pect them to bite the hand that houses or will house them.
plaintiffs sue their housing project and fear retaliation from that
project, they can foresee moving to another project; the metropolitan housing authority, which sets metropolitan-wide policies, would be harder to "escape." Whether well-founded or not,
this concern could cause plaintiffs to hesitate before initiating a
suit against the metropolitan authority. Likewise, defendants
already involved in the suit who politically and economically depend on and cooperate with the metropolitan authority might be
reluctant to initiate an adversarial relationship with it. Thus,
99. See supra note 26; Interview with Rep. Myron Orfield, Minn. H. Rep.
(Oct. 11, 1992); Interview with Hollman Litigation Advisory Team from MidMinnesota Legal Assistance (Oct. 12, 1992).
100. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 338.
101. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 328 (contrasting lawsuits brought
to correct specific injustices with lawsuits brought to address systemic
discrimination).
102. Rusk, supra note 2, at 3.
103. Supra note 99 (interviews); see also supra note 26.
104. Supra note 99 (interviews).
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although courts cannot accord plaintiffs as a class with complete
relief absent metropolitan housing authorities, suits will continue to commence in their absence.
B. A COURT'S POWER TO REMEDY

SEGREGATION IN PUBLICLY

FUNDED HOUSING

1.

Recognizing a Metropolitan-Wide Problem

Several major principles have emerged regarding courts'
powers to provide metropolitan-wide remedies for fair housing
violations stemming from segregation or the failure to promote
fair housing. 10 5 If a court finds that defendants' behavior in any
way fostered effective segregation, 10 6 it may impose a metropolitan-wide remedy to correct the relevant housing market.'0 7 Severe effective segregation, even absent proof of intentional
segregation or "fostering behavior," may be sufficient to permit a
court to impose a metropolitan-wide remedy.' 0 8 Title VIII prohibits discrimination in public housing and creates an affirmative duty for federal agencies, like HUD, to administer all
activities in furtherance of the Act's fair housing policy. 10 9
When a public housing authority violates its affirmative duty to
further the Act's policy, federal courts possess broad power to
fashion a remedy. 1 0
105. If a court does find de jure segregation or a constitutional violation, it
may order corrective action beyond the local boundaries within which the violation occurred if the relevant housing market extends beyond the local limits.
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1976); NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F.
Supp. 361, 366 (D. Mass. 1989).
106. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 317-18 (discussing behavior fostering segregative effect).
107. For a comprehensive overview of remedies, see Roisman & Tegeler,
supra note 5, at 328, 337-42. Courts have not only awarded damages and
granted injunctions but have given specific directives: rezoning, invalidating
exclusionary zoning, requiring that violators establish fair housing authorities
and/or funds and administer them affirmatively to correct segregation, or ordering that individuals be moved to desegregated neighborhoods at public cost. Id.
108. See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305-06.
109. Id. at 302. Pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 570.905, all recipients of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) must agree to administer all housingrelated activities to further fair housing policy. Dubin, supra note 12, at 790.
110. The Gautreaux Court also held that granting metropolitan area relief
did not constitute impermissible interference which would "consolidate or in
any way restructure local government units.... [because it] would neither force
suburban governments to submit public housing proposals to HUD nor displace
the rights and powers accorded local government entities under federal or state
housing statutes or existing land-use laws." Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305-06.
Once a court establishes liability, it is not limited to ordering HUD "to perform
acts which would be required of it even absent a finding of past culpability."
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Two categories of judicial remedies have emerged from legal
developments in this area: court-ordered governmental agency
action and court-ordered community action. In the paradigm
case of the former category, Hills v. Gautreaux,1 11 the Supreme
Court ordered HUD to create housing alternatives for low-income persons of color in the Chicago suburbs, 1 12 even though
suburbs had not engaged in unconstitutional behavior or fostered the effective segregation. 1 3- The Gautreaux decision
greatly impacted subsequent fair housing cases by extending the
definition of the relevant housing market to cover the surrounding suburbs. 1 14 The Court recognized that only a broad, flexible,
practical, and metropolitan-wide remedy would suffice. 1 15 In
dealing with remedies involving remedial community action,
SouthernBurlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount LauNAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 367 (D. Mass. 1989). Furthermore, if the
court does find any discriminatory housing practice, the Fair Housing Act expressly provides that a district court may grant "any... affirmative action as
may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (1992).
When an agency "knowingly created, promoted, and funded racially segregated housing," courts have fashioned highly invasive solutions, sometimes directly involving persons not parties to the suit. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 299
(ordering the Chicago Housing Authority and HUD to create housing alternatives for low-income residents in the suburbs); United States v. City ofYonkers,
856 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1988) (entering remedial consent decree elaborating
long-term framework for city to provide desegregated, low-income housing
plan), rev'd in part sub nom., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990);
Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1289, 1290 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (developing and extending consent decree requiring new tenant selection and assignment plan,
establishing a housing mobility division, providing one-for-one replacement if
any subsidized units scheduled for demolition); Young v. Pierce, 640 F. Supp.
1476, 1479 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (requiring 25 households from a white project to
trade apartments with 25 households from black projects),rev'd on other
grounds by 822 F.2d 1368 (5th cir. 1987); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (requiring new construction, extensive rehabilitation, and improved services, specifying means by which local officials would finance remedy), affd in pertinentpart, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), affd on othergrounds
by, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
111. See Gautreaux,425 U.S. at 296.
112. The Court based its decision on effective segregation within Chicago
itself, HUD's unconstitutional behavior, and HUD's authority to act beyond the
Chicago city limits. Id.
113. Following the decision, the district court ordered that HUD move several thousand very low-income minority families to the white suburbs, where
most flourished, even though they received no special assistance of any kind
beyond the change of location and the housing subsidy itself. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 330-31.
114. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296; see supra notes 14-15.
115. See Gautreaux,425 U.S. at 297.
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rel11 6 proved to be the high water mark in this area. The New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a developing municipality in a
metropolitan area may not physically and economically exclude
low and moderate income housing. The court remedied the situation with a detailed and invasive desegregation plan.1 178 Few
state courts have followed Mount Laurel's activist lead."
Even these highly invasive remedies have limits. Some
courts ruling on school district funding and desegregation cases
have decided against imposing metropolitan-wide remedies," 19
but these cases are easily distinguished from effective segregation in housing cases. 1 20 Courts in these cases respected the
limits on judicial power to actually restructure local governmental units such as school districts or tax bases. 1 21 Imposing a
metropolitan-wide housing desegregation order against HUD or
PHA's would not require local government restructuring because it would effect change through incentives and program in116. Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
117. The Mount Laurel court based its holding on the New Jersey constitution, which expressly reserved land-use regulation to the state legislature, and
applied state due process and equal protection clauses, broader than the federal
clauses.
Furthermore, community regulations must affirmatively provide housing
opportunities for low and moderate income persons up to its "fair share" of the
regional need. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 724, 725. Since Mount Laurel, the
requirement that all communities in a region provide decent, low-income housing in proportion to their population and rate of development has been dubbed
"fair share" policy, although specific policies vary in specificity, numerical goals
formulas, and assessed penalties.
118. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 349, 354 (noting that similar approaches appeared only in Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and New
Hampshire).
119. In San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the
Court rejected a constitutional attack on a local public education financing system based on community wealth. Id. at 16. The Court concluded that discrimination on the basis of wealth is not subject to strict scrutiny, but only to
rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 29. On that basis, the Court rejected plaintiffs'
request for a metropolitan-wide restructuring of school financing. In Milliken
v. Bradley, the Court, stating that federal courts are fundamentally restrained
from actually restructuring the operations of state and local governments,
again refused to formulate the requested metropolitan remedy which would
have consolidated a number of school districts. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717, 740-42 (1974). Fair housing cases in which courts order a metropolitan
entity to remedy segregation do not require a fundamental restructuring of local government.
120. Comment, supra note 20, at 587.
121. Id.
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novation rather than through restrictions on local government
122
decision making.
2. Ordering Desirable Parties to Join if Feasible
When a civil lawsuit commences without a party in whose
absence the court cannot accord complete relief, the court possesses the power to order that person to join the suit as to the
appropriate claims. 123 A court ordering joinder under these circumstances does not engage in judicial activism. To the contrary, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require such
joinder. 12 4 When egregious segregation results from intra-community and inter-community actions, a court cannot accord complete relief
without addressing both causes in its desegregation
25
order.'
In fair housing cases, aside from the need to accord complete relief, several policy considerations compel court-ordered
joinder. The interests of judicial economy 1 26 favor joinder, because the complex administrative scheme may lead to crossclaims, counter-claims, party dismissal, or multiple lawsuits liti122. E.g., Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (6th
Cir. 1987).
123. FED. R. Cirv. P. 19(a)(1). The rule serves three classes of interests: the
present parties' interests, the potential but absent parties' interests, and society's interest in the "orderly, expeditious administration ofjustice." Tankersley
v. Albright, 514 F.2d 956, 965 (7th Cir. 1975) (articulating the need to balance
these interests). The rule seeks to avoid unnecessary, multiple litigation, to
provide the parties with complete relief, and to protect the absent parties rights
and interests. CBS, Inc. v. Film Corp. of Am., 545 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (E.D.
Penn. 1982) (balancing classes of interests to determine if additional party to
creditors' action should be joined). The current version of the rule eliminates
the need to distinguish between necessary and indispensable parties by providing a balancing test by which a court determines whether it should order an
absent party to join. Broussard v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 398 F.2d
885, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1968) (describing effect of current joinder rules); JTG of
Nashville, Inc. v. Rhythm Band, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 623, 627 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)
(favoring joinder over dismissal of claim). When it is possible to join an absent
necessary party, dismissal is not proper and the court should order that party
to join. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 103 v. Irmscher &
Sons, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 394, 397 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (explaining that policy behind
joinder, to avoid dismissal of parties whenever possible, is consistent with
justice).
124. Rule 19(a) states "Ifthe person [in whose absence the court cannot accord complete relief] has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party." FED. R. Cirv. P. 19 (a)(1) (emphasis added).
125. See CBS, Inc., 545 F. Supp. at 1388-89 (stating that court must order
joinder to accord complete relief among parties).
126. See supra note 123 (cited cases).
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gating the same issues. 27 Court-ordered joinder will also help
inform subsequent plaintiffs of the metropolitan housing authority's role in their housing market. Finally, when the court orders joinder under these circumstances, it can reduce the
plaintiffs' fear of retaliation arising from their economic and
political dependence on the previously absent party.
C. A MICROCOSM OF THE NATIONAL DEBATE: THE MINNESOTA
RESPONSE

This Note uses the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota metropolitan area 28 to illustrate the national problem of concentrating poverty 12 9 and race which leads to effective segregation
127. See supra note 123.
128. People commonly refer to Minneapolis and its surrounding suburbs as
the "West Metro" area, and to St. Paul and its surrounding suburbs as the "East
Metro" area. The Metropolitan Council, the Twin Cities regional planning
agency, defines West Metro as Hennepin, Anoka, Carver, and Scott counties.
See METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTmENT FRAMEwoRK Table A-1

(1988).
129. Poverty in the United States continues to concentrate geographically in
our central city neighborhoods. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 17; WILSON,
supra note 17; Sclar, supra note 18. Non-poor persons rarely have contact with
persons living in poverty and are largely unaware of their living conditions.
Most contact occurs through the media, most often during fearful discussions
about the "war on drugs" or escalating crime. Commuters will occasionally see
a homeless person on the street or an unemployed person standing by the freeway holding a "Will work for food" sign. From these limited contacts, the elaborate myths describing a dysfinctional "poverty culture" derives popular
support. Whatever poverty's true cause, it affects those who live with it daily,
the society as a whole, and future generations. By the end of the 1980s, 13.1%
of the U.S. population lived below the poverty level. This figure represents 31.9

million people. U.S.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

1990, at 458 tbl. 743. The total number of very poor, poor, and
near poor individuals is 42.6 million. Id. at tbl. 744. In the West Metro Area in
1980, approximately 7.4 percent of the population lived below the poverty line.
This figure represents 90,300 persons of the 1.2 million West Metro population.
UNITED WAY OF THE MINNEAPOLIS AREA, THE FACE OF THE TwiN CITIES: TRENDS
AFFECTING HEALTH AND HUmAN SERVICES IN THE 90's, at 24 (1991). For housing
program purposes, a household meets the low-income criterion if its gross income does not exceed 50% of the median household income for the geographic
area adjusted for household size. Moderate-income households have incomes
between 50% and 100% of that median household income. Memorandum from
Kathy Novak, supra note 55, at 3-4. One person households within this group
earn $6,024 or less gross income annually and four person households earn
$12,092 or less annually. Id. In contrast, Twin Cities median incomes rose to
$35,700 for one person households and $51,000 for four person households. In
fact, these incomes are 592% and 422% of the poverty line respectively. The
Twin Cities ranks eleventh in per capita monetary income in a sample of 281
U.S. metropolitan areas. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
SUPPLEMENT: STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK 1991, at 34, Table A.
UNITED STATES
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lawsuits. The Minnesota legislature joined a number of states
in passing statutes designed to avert fair housing litigation. 130
The most dramatic reform occurred when the legislature created
the Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Authority (Metro
HRA) in 1974.131 Previously, only individual communities could
apply for authorization to act as housing and land-use planning
32
bodies in order to supplement federal agency efforts.'
1.

The Metropolitan Housing Authority's Effect on
Segregation through Low-Income Housing Supply

The Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Act of 1974
vested the Metropolitan Council' 33 with full powers to act as a
Although a smaller than national percentage of Twin Cities residents lives in
poverty, the gap between median and low-income households is dramatic.
In Minneapolis, the 1980 poverty rate reached 13.5 percent across all
groups, but significantly differed among groups to the detriment of persons of
color as follows: African-Americans, 30%; Native Americans and Asian-Americans, 40%; female-headed households, 30%; and children under 18 living with
their families, 18%. UNITED WAY supra, at 10. Approximately three-quarters of
the entire West Metro population of color resides in Minneapolis itself. Id.
Studies show that as minority concentrations increase within a neighborhood,
white and affluent residents begin to leave in accelerating numbers. See
ORFIELD AND AsmaNAzE, supra note 17, at 12-13, 25. Extreme segregation results, making many public housing projects clearly identifiable by race. HUD
defines "clearly identifiable" to mean that a project houses a population 90% or
more minority or varies by 15% or more from the representation of minorities in
the overall tenant population for projects filled from the same waiting lists. See
Hollman v. Kemp, No. 4-92-712, 34 (D. Minn. filed July 27, 1991) (complaint on
file with the Minnesota Law Review).
130. Some commentators believe this movement occurred in response to
New Jersey's exclusionary zoning prohibition, later codified in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10.5.1 (West 1992). Interviews, supra note 98.
131. 1974 Minn. Laws 359, § 1; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.01 (West 1992);
supra note 99 (interviews).
132. Supra note 99 (interviews).
133. In 1967, the Minnesota Legislature created the Metropolitan Council, a
state agency that functions as a regional level of government "'to coordinate the
planning and development of the metropolitan area.' The legislation established a regional government agency uniquely capable of dealing effectively
with the problems of an entire metropolitan area." STATE OF MINN. DEP'T OF
ADmIN., MINNESOTA GUIDEBOOK TO STATE AGENCY SERVICES 1987-1990, at 242
(6th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MnNEsoTA GUIDEBOOK]; MINN. STAT. §§ 473.122-

473.249 (1992); MINN. R. 5800.0100-5800.0150 (1992). The council has seventeen members, sixteen of whom the governor appoints to four-year terms, and
the seventeenth is a full-time chair appointed to no specific term. The Council's
full-time paid staff number approximately 200. MnmNESOTA GUIDEBOOK, supra,
at 242. Operating through a committee structure, the Council plans for major
regional systems governing sewers, airports, housing, parks, highways, transit,
air and water quality, solid waste, land use, health, arts, and services to aging.
Id. The Metropolitan Council promulgated a MetropolitanDevelopment Guide
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regional housing and land-use planning authority. 1-3 The Act
explicitly addressed low-income housing needs. 13 5 The legislature ordered the Metropolitan Council, as Metro HRA, to adopt
regulations, standards, and guidelines to determine which matters it considered of metropolitan significance 36 and to establish procedures for reviewing these matters "to promote the
orderly and economic development, public and private, of the
metropolitan area."13 7 The legislature further required that
"It]he council shall review all proposed matters determined to be
of metropolitan significance as to their consistency with and effect upon metropolitan system plans ... 138and their adverse effects on other local governmental units."
as required by MmN. STAT. § 473.145 (1992), consisting of"a compilation of policy statements, goals, standards, programs, and maps prescribing guides for the
orderly and economical development, public and private, of the metropolitan
area." Id. The guide "shall recognize and encompass physical, social, or economic needs of the metropolitan area and those future developments which will
have an impact on the entire area .... " Id. The Metropolitan Development
Guide contains numerous chapters that undergo frequent revision. The chapter
most applicable to housing issues is the HousingDevelopment Guide which codifies the Metro HRA's housing regulations. The Metropolitan Council adopted
the Housing Development Guide in 1971. The Council amended the housing
guide in 1975, 1977, 1985, and 1988 as a chapter of the Metropolitan Development Guide.
134. 1974 Minn. Laws 359 § 3.
135. 1974 Minn. Laws 359 § 1; MINN. STAT. § 473B.15 (1974) (repealed 1975
as obviated).
The conditions found to exist by the municipal housing and redevelopment act as amended continue to exist...; substandard, slum and
blighted areas exist in the metropolitan area which cannot be
redeveloped without government assistance; there is a shortage of decent, safe and sanitary dwelling accommodations available to persons
of low and moderate income at rentals or prices they can afford; many
municipalities in the metropolitan area are unable adequately to provide the financing and staff necessary to an effective municipal housing and redevelopment authority; for each such municipality to
establish a separate authority would result in an inefficient use of
manpower and services; and there is therefore a need to enable the
metropolitan council to make available to the municipalities in the
metropolitan area those services provided for in the municipal housing
and redevelopment act.
MINN. STAT. § 473B.15 (1974) (repealed 1975 as obviated).
136. The Act enumerated factors that the Metro HRA must consider in deciding whether a matter is of metropolitan significance. MmN. STAT.
§ 473B.061, subd. 2 (repealed 1975). The legislature ordered the Metro HRA to
promulgate regulations accordingly and submit them for approval during the
1975 legislative session. MmNN. STAT. § 473B.061, subd. 1 (1974) (repealed
1975).

137.

MINN. STAT.

§ 473.173, subd. 2 (1992).

138. MIN. STAT. § 473.173, subd. 4(6) (1992). In addition, the Metro BRA,
under MnN. STAT. § 473.171 (1992), reviews for approval any applications for
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In answer to its statutory mandate to act as Metro HRA, the
Metropolitan Council adopted a number of regulations and revised others, 13 9 including a regulation which dealt specifically
with how communities must supply a share of the low-income

housing supply, Policy 39.140 Policy 39 states "[i]n reviewing applications for fluinds, the Metropolitan Council will recommend
priority in funding based on the local unit of government's current provision of housing opportunities for people with low and
moderate incomes, and its plans and programs to provide such
housing opportunities in the future."14 1 In 1976, the Metro HRA
revised its housing allocation plans to compare numerically each
community's low-income housing supply to the entire region according to a five-factor formula. 42 The Metro HRA then prioritized funding requests for community infrastructure or
development projects according to community success in supplying low- and moderate-income housing. 143 The Metro HRA also
offered communities an additional incentive to participate: acstate and federal aid having metropolitan impact, and under MINN. STAT.
§ 473.175 (1992 &Supp. 1993), reviews for comment and recommendation local
comprehensive development plans. The Council may require a local government to revise its comprehensive plan and may sue the community if necessary
to force a revision. Id. at subd. 1, 3. It is unclear from the statute whether
housing oversight was meant to be part of this power under the comprehensive
plan review process. The comprehensive plan review process, however, should
include making certain that the plans are consistent with metropolitan system
plans.
139. See supra notes 133-135 (discussing the structure and role of the Metropolitan Council).
140. The Metro HRA adopted Policy 39 (then Policy 13) as part of the Metropolitan Development Guide's housing chapter, February 25, 1971, despite
strong suburban opposition. Memorandum from Phil Cohen to Metropolitan
Council (Oct. 26, 1978) (on file with the Metropolitan Council). Even though a
locality's participation in the Metro HRA is strictly voluntary, in order to receive certain funding, the locality must submit to the Metro HRA a comprehensive plan subject to "fair share" review. Id. at 12-13.
141. METROPOLrTAN COUNCm, 6 HousING DEvELOPmENT Gums 45 (1985).
Policy 13 originally read, "Assign a lower priority in the review of federal fid
requests to municipalities whose plans and ordinances do not provide for lowand moderate- income housing." Memorandum from Phil Cohen, supra note
140, at 15 app. The 1973 and 1977 amendments to Policy 13 softened its wording, sounding more positive, yet allowing the Council to reach communities that
did not adequately provide for low- and moderate-income housing. In 1974, the
Council assigned numerical rankings for the first time under Policy 39 (then
Policy 31) to show each community where it stood in relation to the entire region, perhaps in response to the Mount Laurel final decision. Id.; see supra
notes 116-117 and accompanying text (discussing Mount Laurel decision).
142. Memorandum from Phil Cohen, supra note 140, at 7-8 (describing the
five-factor formula).
143. Id. at 10.
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cess to federal housing assistance programs, then ripe with
funding. 144
During the years in which the Metro HRA strongly enforced
Policy 39,145 the suburban share of subsidized housing units increased dramatically. 146 One supporter noted that the changes
occurred without litigation because the Council had recognized
and addressed the regional nature of fair housing issues. 147
When the federal budget for public housing subsidies declined in
the early 1980s, the Metropolitan Council relaxed its Policy 39
review process.1 48 No one explored alternative means to offset
inconveniences communities might encounter in assuring their
share of low-income housing units. 14 9 Although the advent of
portable housing vouchers greatly reduced the need to construct
public housing projects and nearly eliminated the cost to communities of supplying low-income housing, 150 in the absence of
144. Id. at 10-11.
145. The Council enforced Policy 39 vigorously from its inception in 1971
until 1978. It has not reviewed a single funding request on Policy 39 grounds
since the early 1980s. Supra note 99 (interviews).
146. The share increased from 10% of the total (1878 units) to 35% of the
total (11,311 units), while the central city share decreased from 90% to 65%,
and the number of communities providing subsidized rental housing increased
nearly seven-fold. Cohen, supra note 139, at 3. Cohen also mentioned that 58%
of subsidized suburban units became available to families whereas before, most
suburban units were available only to the elderly. The housing allocation plan
set a goal of 40% elderly and 60% family units in 1976. See Memorandum from
Trudy McFall to Metropolitan Council (Dec. 18, 1975) (discussing impact of
1975 Metropolitan Allocation Plan for subsidized housing) (on file with the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities).
147. 'This progress has been achieved with an almost total absence of the
court actions that have plagued other regions of the nation and which have, in
various ways, established a growing legal foundation for the concept that lowincome housing is a regional, and not purely local, responsibility." Memorandum from Phil Cohen, supra note 140, at 4.
148. Federal assistance declined in the early 1980s from 4000 new units per
year to 500 new units per year for the metropolitan area. Telephone Interview
with Research Department, Metropolitan Council (October 1, 1993). Nevertheless, opening 500 additional units per year in the booming suburbs to low-income families of color would make a tremendous impact on intra-community
segregation. Also, federal funding for housing subsidies should increase in light
of growing concerns about inner-city isolation. Suburban communities should
at least make a good faith showing by openly planning to improve low-income
housing availability should federal funding increase. The Metropolitan Council
could conduct Policy 39 review of applications requesting funding under transportation, highway, and sewer bonding authority. If metropolitan dollars pay
for suburban expansion, some of those resources should be applied toward desegregated housing. Interviews, supra note 99.
149. Supra note 99 (interviews).
150. CmA, supra note 2, at 27.
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extra support, metropolitan communities became more resistant
to Policy 39.151
Apparently, some improvement continued in the suburbanto-city low-income housing supply ratios even after Policy 39 enforcement ceased. 152 Comparing these figures with annual supply rates, however, demonstrates the danger of premature
optimism.'

53

Because demand for subsidized housing continues

grow,' 5 4

to
slowing supply rates in the suburbs and increasing
supply rates in the cities will tend to accelerate race and poverty
concentration. Seeing boom growth occurring in several residential suburbs, 155 one might expect suburban growth in low151. Supra note 99 (interviews).
152. By mid-1992, suburban communities supplied approximately 44% of total subsidized units while the central cities supplied the remainder. Metropolitan Council, Changes in the Subsidized Housing Market in the Twin Cities
MetropolitanArea, 1980-1989, at tbl. B-2 (Janet Pershing, ed., 1990), reprinted
in Cm, supra note 2, at 28 [hereinafter Changes in the Subsidized Housing
Market]. The following data represent a sampling of low-income housing supply ratios at three stages of enforcement.
Pre-Policy 39
Policy 39 Peak
Post-Policy 39
central cities
90%
65%
56%
(annual rate)
357/yr
496/yr
suburbs
10%
35%
44%
(annual rate)
1250/yr
805/yr
Id. The annual rate is averaged over a number of years to adjust for market
fluctuations. For example, between 1971 and 1978, the peak enforcement
years, the central cities supplied a total of 2500 additional units or 357 per year.
Id.
153. Id. After enforcement ceased, the annual supply rate increased in the
central city to 496 additional units per year and decreased in the suburbs to 805
additional units per year: the central city rate increased by 39.3%, and the
suburban rate decreased by 35%. Id. Furthermore, the ratio of elderly to family units had once again shifted from 42%/58% to 76%/24% against a 40%/60%
ideal despite sharp increases in the number of low-income families needing subsidized housing. Percentages derived from Changes in the Subsidized Housing
Market, supra note 152, at 28.
154. MEETING THE REGION'S HousING NEEDS, supra note 55, at 15.
155. Nearly all jobs that low-income persons can obtain are created in the
outer-ring suburbs, yet housing available to them concentrates in the central
city. John Kasarda names this pattern "spacial mismatch" and argues that
spacial mismatch perpetuates poverty because without housing or transit help,
people living in poverty cannot bridge the geographic gap between where they
can afford to live and where they can obtain a job. Kasarda (1989), supra note
18, at 35. Minneapolis employment decreased 24% after 1980, and outer-ring
suburban employment increased 127% over the same time period. UNITED
WAY, supra note 17, at 20. Transportation and information inadequacies act as
hiring and commuting barriers. Two researchers, WlsoN, supra note 17, at
182-83; and KAus, supra note 18, at 120, attribute continuing poverty in part to
these barriers. These barriers have combined to produce a grim result: West
Metro residents living in poverty have concentrated primarily in four central
Minneapolis neighborhoods where jobs are being lost, not created. UNrrED
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income housing to at least keep pace with previous rates. Cityto-suburban supply ratios have not returned to pre-Policy 39
levels, 15 6 but the statistical trend demonstrates that they have
deteriorated since enforcement ceased and could revert to the
levels which originally sparked intervention.' 5 7 By the end of
1989, the federal 158 and Minnesota 15 9 governments subsidized' 60 approximately 44,366 housing units16 1 in the Twin Citsupra note 17, at 25; see also, Bob Gilbert, Do suburbs owe a debt to the
city?, SOUTHWEST J. Aug. 1991, at 6, 7; Peter Leyden, Job gap growing between
city, suburbs, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRm. June 16, 1992, at 1A, 10A (reporting
Minnesota Department of Jobs and Training data). In 1980, 70% of West Metro
residents living in poverty resided in Minneapolis, with 61%of West Metro residents living in poverty concentrated in four neighborhoods: Near North, Central, Powderhorn, and Phillips. UNITED WAY, supra note 17, at 25. In 1988,
74% of residents in those neighborhoods received public assistance. Id. These
patterns describe concentrating poverty. Exclusionary zoning, a practice thriving in most developing suburbs and re-gentrifying city areas, prevents construction of housing accessible to low-income persons. Dubin, supra note 12, at 75556, 768-73. Exclusionary ordinances might, for example, require high minimum lot size and square footage, garages, and other expensive amenities; or
prohibit attached housing, mobile homes, or anything other than detached, single-family homes. For excellent discussions of exclusionary zoning, see Dubin,
supra note 12; John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mount Laurel: Is Affordable
Housing FairHousing?, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 361, 362, 370 (1988).
156. MEETING THE REGION'S HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 55, at 20.
157. See supra notes 152-153 (data analyzed).
158. Currently, HUD restricts federal housing subsidies to persons and families with incomes at or below 80% of median income, adjusted for household
size and geographic area, for example, $40,800 for a Twin Cities household of
four. Novak, supra note 55, at 3-4. This limit should capture low-income
households and many moderate-income households, yet low-income housing remains scarce. In Minneapolis, around 5000 families participate in publicly subsidized housing but approximately 3800 families and 1700 additional
individuals are on the waiting lists. Hollman complaint, supra note 26, at 14.
159. Although nearly one-third of all renter households exceeded the HUD
guideline to pay their rent, only 15% of all renter households received any subsidies. MEETING THE REGION'S HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 55, at 18-19. Just
over one-third of households living below the poverty line received some housing assistance. Id. at 19.
160. Subsidies take the form of public housing in projects or scattered-site
plans or vouchers which pay the difference between 30% of the household's income and the unit's market value. Novak, supra note 55, at 3. HUD places
strict maximum market value limits on the units it will subsidize. These limits
seem fair for cost-containment reasons, but they inadvertently provide one
mechanism by which private landlords can exclude low-income persons, the
practice of raising the rent to just above HUD limits so that the units cannot be
subsidized. See Hollman complaint, supra note 26, at
109-11 (discussing
authorization needed to rent more expensive units).
161. MEETING THE REGION'S HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 55, at 19. The metropolitan area supplies about 900,000 total housing units, including 300,000
rental units. Id. at 16. The two central cities supply 57% of total subsidized
WAY,
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ies metropolitan area, but
the government-defined need was at
1 62
least twice that number.
2. Reviewing the Metropolitan Housing Authority's Actions
The Metropolitan Council is a state administrative agency,
covered by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).16 s The
Metropolitan Council, acting as the Metro HRA, adopted Policy
39 in response to a legislative mandate to address problems of
metropolitan significance. 1'4 In determining whether the Metro
HRA has acted legally with respect to relaxing Policy 39 enforcement, the court faces threshold questions such as whether and
to what extent it may review Metropolitan Council actions.
III. VIEWING METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITIES
AS INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN FAIR HOUSING
SUITS
In reviewing defendant metropolitan housing agencies' inaction with respect to fair housing issues, courts may decide to
follow strict administrative law precedent, or they may decide to
extend principles obtained directly from cases concerning HUD's
housing, while approximately 150 suburbs supply the remainder; some suburbs
have no subsidized units at all. Id. at 20.
162. Id. at 18, 19. Federal housing assistance decreased after the early
1980s, but poverty increased. Nenno, supra note 2, at 260, 261, 264. In 1985,
the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities estimated that before 1995, lowincome households would require one-fifth of the entire Twin Cities housing
supply, including nearly one-third of any new units added. MEmhoPOTrAN
CouNcm, supranote 141, at 7. Ideally, 30% of those new units should have two
bedrooms, and 36% three bedrooms. Id. The central neighborhoods of Minneapolis and St. Paul cannot continue to absorb these increases.
Multifamily dwellings, such as apartment buildings and other attached
housing, often best suit low-income persons' needs and are concentrated in the
central cities and first-ring suburbs. Multifamily housing accounts for approximately 34% of the total Twin Cities housing units. MEETING THE REGION'S
HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 55, at 16. Most so-called multifamily structures
contain only studio or one-bedroom units. Units with two or more bedrooms
comprise only 21.3% of central city units, 16.4% of first ring suburb units,
11.4% of second ring suburb units, and 11.3% of outer ring suburb units. Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities, unpublished data. In 1975, the Metropolitan Council established a guideline that 60% of metro area subsidized housing
should serve multiple person households (approximately 40% should serve elderly). Memorandum from Trudy McFall, supra note 146, at 2. By 1992, only
24% of subsidized housing served this type of household. See supra note 152
(data analyzed).
163. MINN. STAT. § 473.173, subd. 5 (1992) (applying the Minnesota codification of the APA to review of matters of metropolitan significance).
164. See supra note 133 (discussion of Metropolitan Council).
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behavior to analogous agencies at other government levels. 165
When plaintiffs in a metro desegregation case do not include a
relevant metropolitan housing authority as a defendant, the
court should order the agency to join the suit as a defendant and
should review
its actions under the HUD "afrmative duty"
16 6
standard.
A.

WHY TRADrIONAL REMEDIES FAIL TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS REGIONAL HOUSING ISSUES: THE
PATCHWORK

REMEDY

PROBLEM

Because so many actors affect low-income housing accessibility, plaintiffs filing housing segregation complaints must ordinarily plead numerous liability theories against multiple
defendants. 167 These defendants often include several layers of
government that administer housing programs. 168 The liability
facing each government layer derives from a different source of
law. 169 Providing an adequate remedy grows increasingly
com70
plex as metropolitan areas rapidly expand and develop.'
In Minnesota, no entity other than the Metro HRA can fill
the jurisdictional gaps and level the inter-community playing
17
field adequately to correct metropolitan-wide segregation. '
Without Metro HRA participation, a court can create a truly
metropolitan solution if three conditions exist. First, every community within the metropolitan area must establish and fund its
73 must
own PHA. 172 In addition, HUD or the CDBG program
174
maintain a funding presence with each PHA.
Finally, zoning
in each community must permit some construction of non-luxury, multifamily housing in which households use vouchers to
purchase housing.' 7 5 Unfortunately, none of these three conditions are satisfied in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.
165. See supra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
166. See Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 338.
167.

Id.

168. Id.
169. Id. at 338-41.
170. Id. at 328.
171. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing Metropolitan
Council jurisdiction).
172. See supra note 63 (describing PHA liability).
173. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing the duties that
accompany federal and some state dollars).
174. See supra notes 61-62.
175. See supra note 150.
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Federal Agency Liability: Requiring HUD to Act

When HUD does not affirmatively promote fair housing, reviewing courts can order it to take extensive corrective action.1 7 6
Violations of the affirmative duty can include administering effectively segregated housing, failing to actively provide desegregated housing, or failing to properly oversee grantee PHA's.' 77
Unfortunately, if a community does not have a PHA or its P11A
does not receive HUD funding, a condition likely in wealthy or
swiftly-growing suburbs, courts cannot reach PHA behavior via
HUD in order to fashion a remedy. 1 7 Remedies provided in this
context can only produce fairer housing in a patchwork pattern
across a metropolitan area, skipping those localities least likely
to supply their fair share of low-income housing.' 7 9
In communities that have no connection with HUD, courts
can order HUD to form a presence and allocate resources to create fair housing opportunities.' 8 0 In practice, however, this type
of order lacks impact because implementation strategies often
fail.' 8 ' HUD project proposals must survive local zoning scrutiny; a court mandate to HUD cannot overcome local zoning
board opposition.' 8 2 If HUD offers localities financial incentives
to provide more low-income housing, it must expend large sums,
particularly in affluent suburbs, to encourage localities to alter
the reliable status quo.' 8 3 HUD could increase the number of
vouchers in circulation, but low-income persons cannot use HUD
subsidies in the suburbs if the only available housing exceeds
the fair market price or if landlords refuse to participate. 8 4
Thus, plaintiffs may "win", but very few members of the class
will actually gain access to suburban housing. 185

176. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (discussing HUD
obligations).
177. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
180. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 285, 286 (1976); see also supra text accompanying note 86.
181. See supra note 24.
182. See supra note 20.
183. See supra note 24.
184. See supra note 17.
185. See supra note 17.
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2. Establishing Local PHA Liability
86
Recipients of particular HUD-managed or CDBG funds
must affirmatively administer all housing and community development programs to further Title VIII goals, but not every PHA
receives those grants.' 8 7 Only one circuit has explicitly recognized that the obligation to promote fair housing extends 8to
8
PHA's regardless of whether they receive conditional funding.'
Recognizing that all federal housing operated under intentional
segregation until some time between 1954 and 1968, many
courts give deference to arguments that effective segregation
patterns within those programs derived from long term intentional segregation.' 8 9 Courts should similarly recognize that
state and local intentional segregation probably leads to effective segregation in long standing programs operating today. 190
If federal statutory obligations do extend to PHA's, then at least
those PHA's which operated under de jure segregation must affirmatively promote fair housing. 19 ' Even this generous analysis cannot reach the suburbs that only recently established
PHA's.
Commentators recognize that although local agency and
city liability arguments can be helpful, they have not been an
essential focal point for lawsuits because they are individually
responsible for small pieces of the regional problem. 192 Minnesota communities may establish PHA's, but they are not required to do so.19 3 In Hollman, plaintiffs residing within the
Minneapolis city limits sued the city of Minneapolis and its
PHA.' 9 4 Although this suit can perhaps address the inter-

186. See supra note 4 (introducing Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG)).
187. Id. A community could defensively form a PHA and support it with
private fimding alone, thus preventing HUD or other PHA's from administering
programs within that community.
188. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth.; 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d
Cir. 1973) (noting that the duty to integrate arises in part from Title VIII, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3608(d)(5) (1988)).
189. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 339.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 340.

193. See

Mm'N. STAT.

§ 473B (1992).

194. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the facts from
Hollman v. Kemp, No. 4-92-712 (D. Minn. filed July 27, 1991)). Although plaintiffs implicated five defendants, should plaintiffs prevail, they cannot achieve a
comprehensive, metropolitan remedy through these defendants.
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neighborhood segregation problems, it cannot fully address seg195
regation resulting from city-suburban housing disparities.
3.

Suing Communities Piecemeal: An Inefficient Option

Plaintiffs in a metro desegregation case can attempt to
make each suburb a defendant or bring a test case against one
suburb. 196 In order to state a constitutional or federal civil
rights 197 claim against a local government unit for exclusionary
zoning,' 98 the plaintiffs must present one of two difficult scenarios. They must demonstrate either that the suburb intended to
discriminate or that the zoning board action directly caused citysuburban segregation.' 9 9 Zoning boards do not exclude low-income persons or persons of color directly, but according to indirect, effective criteria. 20 0 Consequently, the former claim
historically fails. 20 1 Cause-in-fact arguments made by non-resi20 2
dents of the community rarely succeed.
Local government units derive zoning power from state police power. 20 3 Plaintiffs attempting to establish local liability in
the absence of a valid federal civil rights claim need to theorize
either a state constitutional violation 20 4 or a state statutory violation.2 0 5 If plaintiffs add state law claims to their federal
claims before a federal court, the state law claims must survive
supplemental jurisdiction scrutiny.20 6 In either district or state
court, standing issues might defeat the claims unless suburban
residents join as plaintiffs and allege that the exclusionary zon195. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the facts from
Hollman v. Kemp, No. 4-92-712 (D. Minn. filed July 27, 1991)).
196. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 323.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
198. Exclusionary zoning arguably perpetuates city-suburban inequities.
Dubin, supra note 12, at 773.
199. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 314-19.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 55, 152.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 320-21; Dubin, supra note 12, at
775.
204. The Mount Laurel approach treats zoning as an exercise of the police
power which must promote the general welfare, meaning the welfare of persons
residing within and outside the locality. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at
344.
205. Id.
206. See supra note 28. If the supplemental jurisdiction request fails, the
appropriate state court must hear these claims in a completely separate action,
no less complex due to the number of defendant suburbs.
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of the suburb by depriving them of a diverse
ing harms members
20 7
community.
B.

THE PROPOSED REMEDY: ORDERING METROPOLITAN
AGENCIES TO JOIN AND REVIEWING THEM UNDER THE

HUD AFFIRMATIVE DuTy

STANDARD

The pending Hollman litigation ignores one crucial actor,
the Metro HRA. 20 8 Plaintiffs in similar cases throughout the
if the
nation may also exclude metropolitan PHA's, particularly
20 9
Hollman case proceeds in the Metro HRA's absence.
Under Minnesota law, the Metro HRA acts as the housing
authority for any communities that do not establish independent
PHA's,210 reviews all local comprehensive plans for consistency
with the Metropolitan Development and Investment Framework, 2 11 and assists localities in accessing federal housing funds
and other funds necessary for community development and expansion. 2 12 Without implicating the Metro HRA, plaintiffs cannot achieve complete relief.21 3 Not only does the Metro HRA
administer subsidized housing where no PHA exists, it has the
authority to review every local comprehensive plan to determine
if the locality participates in providing low-income housing and
it can design incentives through other programs under its authority which HUD cannot access.2 14 In order to affect otherwise unreachable areas and treat suburbs consistently in
imposing a remedy, the court should order the Metro HRA to
join as a defendant. Before reaching other issues the court
should review the Metro HRA's actions and determine whether
the Metro HRA has violated an affirmative duty to administer
publicly funded housing in furtherance of fair housing
principles.
207. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing exclusionary zoning claims).
208. See supra note 133 and text accompanying notes 133-138 (discussing
Metropolitan Council powers arising from the Metropolitan Housing and Redevelopment Act of 1974).
209. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 133 and text accompanying notes 133-138 (regarding
Metropolitan Council powers).
211. See supra note 138 (discussing Metropolitan Council review powers).
212. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
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1. The Court Should Order the Metro HRA to Join as a
Defendant
When both plaintiffs and defendants fail to involve the ap2 15
propriate metropolitan agency in a metro desegregation case,
the court should order joinder so that it can accord complete relief.216 In the Minnesota example, the district court should order the Metro HRA to join the suit as a defendant. 21 7 By
ordering joinder with respect to the effective segregation
claim, 2 18 the court would overcome the barriers which dissuade
plaintiffs from naming the metropolitan authority in the original complaint 219 and serve the interests of judicial economy. Ordering joinder reduces the likelihood that counterclaims and

cross-claims will arise later in the

suit.2 2 0

Although adding an-

other party might initially make the litigation more complex,
this consideration weighs lightly against the likelihood that the
claim against the metropolitan authority can be resolved more
swiftly than claims against the other parties. 22 11 Redress can begin while the court hears the remainder of the case over the
course of many years.
2. Reviewing the Metro IHRA's Behavior Under the
Affirmative Duty Standard
The metropolitan agency may move to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on the grounds that the court cannot review agency
action in such a case. 22 2 Although the Supreme Court recently
reversed the general presumption of review to a presumption of
non-review, 22 3 plaintiffs can rebut the presumption in several
ways. 2 24 If the agency is not acting in a prosecutorial manner, if
the enabling statute directs the agency to take action in particular circumstances, or if the agency action falls under section 706
215. See supra notes 26-27 (discussing plaintiffs' suit managment concerns).
216. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 99 (interviews).
218. Plaintiffs would argue that much ofthe segregative effect resulted from
arbitrarily ceasing Policy 39 enforcement and would offer demographic
evidence.
219. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
220. This lack of predictability threatens judicial economy and reasonable
resolution of the parties' interests. Supra note 99 (interviews); supra note 123
(discussing judicial economy).
221. The matter would probably be resolved through a consent decree or settlement before trial. Supra note 99 (interviews).
222. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.

223. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
224. Id.
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of the Administrative Procedures
Act, the unreviewability pre2 25
sumption does not apply.
Far from acting in a prosecutorial manner, the Metro HRA
serves a primarily advisory role, assigning priorities to community plans and applications in accordance with regulations the
legislature requested. 2 26 Those priority ratings then trigger
other consequences. 2 27 The Metro ERA Act limits the agency's
discretion, requiring it to review enumerated matters in accord2 28
ance with regulations to be adopted and relevant statutes.
Finally, the APA permits review under section 706 because allegedly, the agency has unlawfully withheld fair housing en2 29
forcement-action it is bound to provide.
A duty to enforce fair housing regulations such as Policy 39
could derive from three different sources under traditional administrative law: the agency's authorizing statute itself,230 a
long-standing pattern of past agency practice, 23 1 or the developing principle2 32 that when an agency voluntarily adopts regulations they must be enforced as if dictated by statute. 23 3 The
Metro HRA Act imposes an explicit duty to promulgate regulations but does not explicitly state a duty to enforce those regulations.2 34 Instead, the court would look to the decade or more
during which the Metro HRA enforced Policy 39 to find that a
settled rule had been followed during that time. 2 35 If it finds
that the Metro HRA has since departed from a settled rule without giving a contemporaneous explanation, 3 6 the court must
conduct a factual inquiry into the Metro HRA's rationale to determine whether a lawful basis for departure existed. 23 7 Under
developing case law, courts should hold metropolitan agencies
bound by rules which were promulgated within the agencies'
2 38
statutory discretion pursuant to the legislative purpose.
Because the Metro HRA voluntarily adopted Policy 39 pursuant
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
APA in
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id.
See cases supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Phil Cohen, supra note 140.
MXNN. STAT. § 473B.061(3) (1974) (repealed 1975).
See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (explaining application of
the Metro ERA).
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77, 145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77, 145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77, 145 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 77, 145 and accompanying text.
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to its authority to oversee metropolitan area development, it
2 39
should enforce the regulation.
The Metro HRA administers HUD funds and acts as a public housing authority. Thus, the court should look beyond traditional administrative law and hold the Metro HRA to the HUD
affirmative duty standard. The Metro HRA essentially acts in
HUD's stead and arguably has accepted the affirmative duties
incumbent upon HUD itself.2 40 For example, when formulating
a remedy in Ohio, 24 1 the Court ordered the Toledo metropolitan
PHA to take corrective action because it behaved as an extension of HUD, even though the PHA was not a defendant in the
suit.2 42 Similar reasoning applies to the Metro HRA as a HUD
funding conduit. Once the affirmative duty to administer programs to further fair housing has been established, failing to enforce Policy 39, or repealing Policy 39 without adequate
replacement, would violate that affirmative duty. The failure is
evident by the long time lapse since the last Policy 39 priority
assignment in the face of deteriorating housing distribution
24 3
statistics.
This Note does not suggest that having found metropolitanwide segregation, a court can order the metropolitan housing
agency to remedy the situation as the court pleases. For example, in Hollman, if the district court decides to formulate an order directing the Metro HRA to resume Policy 39 enforcement,
the court could not make procedurally intrusive demands to
specify a different manner in which the Metro HRA must enforce the regulation. 2 44 Similarly, the court could not direct the
Metro HRA to specifically enforce the policy as it did in the
past.2 4 5 In formulating a remedy, the court will discover that
Policy 39 contains its enforcement mechanism in its express lan239. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
240. Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 715 F. Supp. 835, 837, 842 (N.D.
Ohio 1989). Following the Jaimes court's reasoning, courts should hold grantee
agencies accountable for administering HUD fimding within HUD standards.
241. Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1101 (6th Cir.
1985).
242. Jaimes v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 715 F. Supp. 835, 840-42 (N.D.
Ohio 1989).
243. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 318.
244. See supra note 105. The court can state what the agency must do, not
how the agency should do its job. NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 368 (D.
Mass. 1989). At most, the court can order the agency to explore alternative
funding sources but the court cannot specify how the agency should conduct the
study. Id.
245. Id.
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guage. The court can simply direct the agency to enforce the
policy.
For other cases in which the metropolitan agency acts as a
housing authority independent from HUD, courts ordering joinder have several options. When no fair housing regulation exists, the court can direct the housing authority to promulgate
regulations and enforcement mechanisms only if the legislature
2 46
has requested promulgation and the agency has not complied.
If a regulation already exists but does not specify its enforcement mechanism, the court can require enforcement, but not a
particular mechanism. 2 4 7 When a regulation specifies its enforcement mechanism, the court can hold the agency bound by
its own rules. 248 Presumably, the agency must enforce its rule
as the rule dictates.
An agency can decide to exhaust the appeals process to extract itself from the court order. This decision can delay the remedial process for years. 249 If an agency refuses to comply with
an enforcement order and does not appeal, the agency opens itself to greater scrutiny and deeper intervention should the
plaintiffs or new parties bring another suit.2 50 Refusing to comply also places an agency in a delicate political position with its
parent legislature. The legislature could construe refusal as
tantamount to willfully refusing to perform a statutory
mandate. 25 1
C.

THE RELIEF: ORDERING THE METROPOLITAN HOUSING
AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE AND SUPPORT ITS EXISTING
FAIR HOUSING REGULATIONS

Once the court determines either that the metropolitan
housing authority failed its obligation to enforce its own fair
housing regulations, or alternatively that it shares HUD's affirmative duty to promote fair housing, the relief is straightforward and immediate. In Hollman, not only can the court order
the Metro HRA to resume prioritizing community funding re246. Id.
247. Courts might be able to specify certain activities if the agency does not
act independently from HUD. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
248.

See supra note 79.

249. APA, supra note 73, §§ 705-06. If the trial court finds that the agency
action was arbitrary and capricious, the court might discipline the agency for
attempting to stall the remedial process. Id.
250. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 335.
251. Jaimes v Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 758 F.2d 1086, 1101 (6th Cir.
1985).
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quests according to Policy 39 criteria, it can require the Metro
HRA to explore alternative compliance incentives. 2 52 Because a
complete administrative structure already exists, 2 53 the comprehensive plan review process could begin immediately. Meeting
increased low-income housing demand has become easier and
more economically efficient since the innovation of portable subsidy vouchers and certificates. 254 Positive changes occurred
swiftly in the 1970s when the Metro HRA enforced Policy 39,255
and similar results could obtain today. 2 56
Conclusion
When residents of segregated low-income housing sue federal, state, or local government actors for administering publicly
funded housing in a manner which reinforces racially segregated housing patterns, but do not also sue the metropolitan
housing authority, the court should take several steps to insure
that complete relief can be accorded. First, the court should order the appropriate metropolitan housing authority to join as a
defendant. The court should then review the alleged nonenforcement of fair housing regulations according to the HUD
affirmative duty standard. In pre-trial conference, the court can
suggest that the parties agree to adjudicate or settle the failure
to enforce claim first. Once the court finds both a duty to enforce
and failure to do so, courts should order the metropolitan authority to enforce its own fair housing policies as a necessary
first step in fashioning a metropolitan-wide remedy.
Streamlining the remedies process in this manner provides
a means to achieve fair housing in an efficient, humane, and legally appropriate manner. Fashioning remedies directed at
agency enforcement might reduce future complex litigation, because the potential for such remedies disciplines agencies which
have improperly relaxed enforcement and encourages state legislatures to fund incentives supporting legislative mandates.

252. Roisman & Tegeler, supra note 5, at 334 (citing Walker v. HUD, 734 F.
Supp. 1231, 1233 (N.D. Tex. 1989); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.
Mo. 1985).
253. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 32.
255. See supra notes 151-152.
256. CmAL, supra note 2, at 27.

